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Abstract—Malware is constantly evolving. Although existing
countermeasures have success in malware detection, correspond-
ing counter-countermeasures are always emerging. In this study,
a counter-countermeasure that avoids network-based detection
approaches by camouflaging malicious traffic as an innocuous
protocol is presented. The approach includes two steps: Traffic
format transformation and side-channel massage (SCM). Format-
transforming encryption (FTE) translates protocol syntax to
mimic another innocuous protocol while SCM obscures traffic
side-channels. The proposed approach is illustrated by trans-
forming Zeus botnet (Zbot) Command and Control (C&C) traffic
into smart grid Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) data. The ex-
perimental results show that the transformed traffic is identified
by Wireshark as synchrophasor protocol, and the transformed
protocol fools current side-channel attacks. Moreover, it is shown
that a real smart grid Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) accepts
the false PMU data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware authors conceal Command and Control (C&C)
traffic1 by masquerading as legitimate web browsing activ-
ity (HTTP or encrypted HTTPS) [1] or Internet relay chat
(IRC). Twitter and DNS queries have also been used to
hide C&C communication channels [2]. Detection techniques
based on reverse engineering, side-channel analysis, etc., have
emerged [3], [4]. Reverse engineering of malware develops
network signatures for malicious traffic filtering [5]. Many bots
use cryptography or obfuscation to disrupt signature-based
detection [6], which can be foiled by blocking all unknown
encrypted traffic [7]. However, this has two drawbacks: (1)
discouraging the use of cryptography makes traffic less secure
and (2) any false positives disrupt legitimate traffic producing
denial of service. Other research uses traffic analysis for
detection. Chen [8] presents timing side-channel analysis for
Zbot detection using hidden Markov model (HMM) and prob-
abilistic context-free grammar (PCFG). Passive DNS traffic
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1In the context of cybersecurity, attackers use C&C infrastructure to issue
C&C instructions to their victims through network.
analysis system for detecting and tracking malicious flux
networks of a botnet is proposed in [9]. Other traffic side-
channels include packet size [10].
In this paper, a counter-countermeasure that obscures the
features used by malware traffic detection tools is presented.
The idea is to camouflage malware traffic as an innocu-
ous application protocol using format-transforming encryption
(FTE) [11] and side-channel massage (SCM). FTE converts
traffic flow to another application protocol using a regular
expression describing the target protocol. This thwarts existing
detection approaches because they detect that the infected
machines are using IRC, HTTP/HTTPS or DNS to communi-
cate. Additionally, the FTE output is processed using SCM to
modify side-channel features, making the system resistant to
side-channel analysis. The motivation of this study is to reveal
the weakness of existing traffic detection techniques and show
that more sophisticated malware traffic detection solutions are
needed.
This counter-countermeasure is illustrated by camouflag-
ing Zbot traffic. Zeus malware is notorious for stealing on-
line financial information. The source code of Zeus is on
Github [12]. In the experiment presented here, the Phasor
Measurement Unit (PMU) communication protocol is the
target protocol for the following reasons: (1) PMU traffic is
in clear text [13], [14], and resistant to countermeasures that
block encrypted traffic; (2) as early as 2009, the possibility
of a power-grid botnet consisting of buggy smart meters was
raised [15]; and (3) the synchrophasor protocol used for PMU
communication is regular, simple and easy to imitate “in its
entirety”. The feasibility of converting botnet traffic to PMU
traffic is explored in this study. Mimicking is done at the
application layer of the protocol stack, which simplifies the
imitation process and reduces the risk of errors. Experimental
results show that the counterfeit PMU can talk with the real
server without being detected. Since the same traffic can be
processed to recover the C&C traffic, the botnet communica-
tions are effectively concealed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II and Section III provide related study and background
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information. The traffic detection counter-countermeasure is
explained in Section IV. In Section V, An example to demon-
strate the utility of the approach is provided. Conclusions and
suggestions for future study are given in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Malware uses traffic camouflaging to hide network traffic.
Spyware Taidoor, a banking trojan discovered in 2008, used
a Yahoo blog as a botnet C&C server [16], the malicious
traffic was camouflaged as HTTP requests to blogs. According
to Kaspersky Lab [17], ChewBacca and evolved Zeus use
the Tor network to hide communications. Pushdo malware
[18] included domain names of large companies or famous
educational institutions in the C&C domain list, which made
network traffic analysis more difficult. The Morto Trojan
[2] sent false DNS requests to a DNS server, which was a
C&C server, and the exchanged message was obfuscated by a
simple Base64 encoding. The proposed method can transform
arbitrary traffic to a target protocol, so that malware detection
techniques looking for features of the original protocol won’t
work.
Besides hiding malware traffic, traffic camouflage can also
be used to evade surveillance and censorship. The Onion
Router (Tor) [19] provides an infrastructure for anonymous
communication over a public network. The idea is to re-
route network traffic through several browser-based short-
lived proxies (called relay nodes) to evade surveillance and
censorship [20]. However, as Tor becomes well-known, some
unpublished relay nodes (bridges) are blocked in authoritarian
countries [21].
To counter that, obfsproxy [22] is developed to circumvent
censorship by camouflaging the Tor traffic between client and
bridge. It supports multiple protocols, called pluggable trans-
ports, which specify how traffic is transformed. ScrambleSuit
[23] is a polymorphic network protocol to obfuscate the trans-
ported application data to defend against active probing and
protocol fingerprinting. SkypeMorph [24] is a Tor pluggable
transport to reshape Tor packets to resemble Skype calls.
StegoTorus [25] first uses chopping to change packet sizes and
timing information, and then uses steganography to disguise
Tor traffic as a message in an innocuous cover protocol,
such as HTTP. FTE [11] evades regular-based deep packet
inspection (DPI) technologies by transforming Tor traffic into
a predefined format. Although FTE is effective in mimicking
the contents of packets, it does not mimic timing information,
which is vulnerable to side-channel analysis. The proposed
SCM method ‘massages’ the timing side-channel to ameliorate
FTE.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Malware Traffic Detection
Network-based malware detection techniques examine the
behavior of underlying malicious activities in the network
traffic. Early study on network-based detection inspect the
network packets for known botnet signatures. DPI technologies
are usually used [26]. However, signature-based detection
suffers from computational complexity and can be easily foiled
by encryption and obfuscation.
Other detection approaches include anomaly [27] detection,
and traffic analysis [8], [9]. Although anomaly detection
might detect unknown malware, it usually has high false
positive rates (FPRs). Traffic analysis exploits artifacts. Many
properties of network traffic (packet size, power consumption,
timing, electromagnetic radiation, etc.) remain observable after
encryption and reveal valuable information. Attacks based
on these properties are known as side-channel attacks. A
timing side-channel attack is presented in [28], which breaks
the anonymity of Tor network by matching packet timing
data from any two Tor users to a model. The comparison
gives a statistical likelihood that the two systems are actually
communicating over Tor. In [10], [29], it is demonstrated that
inter-packet delays and packet size can differentiate between
packet streams coming from different PMUs.
Chen et al. [8] show Zbot traffic can be identified via
timing side-channel analysis. The timing pattern in network
traffic is represented by a deterministic hidden Markov model
(HMM), which can be constructed from the collected inter-
packet delays using the zero-knowledge HMM inference al-
gorithm [30]–[32]. Zbot traffic detection is performed by
comparing the constructed HMMs of the target traffic and
Zbot traffic. This method is leveraged in this study to build
the HMM used for SCM.
B. Format-Transforming Encryption
A network protocol is a set of rules for communication. An
implicit premise most of DPI is that regular expressions are
sufficient for identifying protocols [11]. Tools, such as Snort
[5], Bro [33] and L7-filter [34], use regular expressions to
identify network protocols.
Format-Transforming Encryption (FTE) [11] is developed
to evade regular expression based protocol identification. It
extends conventional symmetric encryption by formatting the
ciphertext. Arbitrary application-layer network traffic can be
transformed into a target protocol using FTE. FTE is used
to evade Internet censorship and surveillance, because the
original protocols are obfuscated.
Although FTE is effective in hiding network protocols, it
can be a challenge to write the regular expression for the target
protocol. First, there is no automated software or procedures to
extract regular expressions from protocols. Second, a regular
expression that fully describes a protocol is usually complex.
Although FTE can evade syntax-based protocol identification,
it is vulnerable to side-channel analysis. Features like packet
size, inter-packet delays etc., can be used for protocol identi-
fication. In this paper, a SCM method is developed to obscure
side-channel features and augment FTE.
The implementation of FTE includes LibFTE and
FTEproxy. LibFTE [35] is a python library to transform string
to ciphertext. FTEproxy [36] is a Tor [37] pluggable transport
layer to resist keyword filtering, censorship and discriminatory
routing policies. LibFTE (version 0.1.0) [35] is used in this
study.
Fig. 1: Control panel of Zeus C & C server
Fig. 2: Zeus builder to generate executables to infect bots
C. Zeus Botnet
Botnets are groups of compromised computers that botmas-
ters (botherders) use to launch attacks over the Internet. As one
of the most famous botnets, Zeus botnet is a malicious network
that steals banking information with keystroke logging and
screen capture [8]. It can also be used in other types of
data or identity theft [38]. Since its first appearance in 2007,
Zeus has been widespread and infecting Windows machines
through drive-by downloads and phishing schemes. Sold on the
black market, Zeus allows technically unsophisticated users
to carry out cybercrimes. According to [39] Trend Micro,
Zeus (2.0.8.9) source code can cost $400-500 in the Russian
market. In 2011, the source code of Zeus was leaked on several
underground forums over the Internet. A security researcher
compiled the code and confirmed it worked ‘like a charm’
[40].
Zbot (version 2.0.8.9) was retrieved from Github [12] for
experimentation. It contains code to build a Zeus Command
and Control (C&C) server and generate executables to infect
victim machines. A Zeus C&C server is a PHP server with
mySQL and Apache. Every time a bot joins the network, the
botmaster can monitor and control it through the control panel.
Figure 1 shows the control panel of Zeus C&C server. To
generate executables to infect bots, Zeus has a builder tool,
where you can specify the configuration directory file and
C&C server address. Figure 2 shows the Zeus builder tool
GUI.
D. PMU in Smart Grid
PMUs measure bus voltages, line currents, and bus fre-
quencies in transmission systems in real-time. Each mea-
surement is tagged with a global positioning system (GPS)
time stamp [10], [29]. Measurement data is sent to Phasor
Data Concentrators (PDCs) via TCP/IP for further processing
[14]. The communications between PMUs and PDCs use the
synchrophasor protocol. In this study, open source software
OpenPDC [41] is used. A typical sequence diagram of commu-
nications between OpenPDC and one PMU in the application
layer is shown in Figure 3. OpenPDC starts a new session
by sending a command asking the PMU to stop current data
transmission, followed by a request for a configuration frame,
which describes the format of PMU measurement packets
used for this transmission. After receiving the configuration
frame from PMU, OpenPDC sends the PMU a start command.
Once the measurement data transmission starts, it will not
stop until a stop command is received or the connection is
lost. OpenPDC acknowledges each measurement data packet
it receives.
OpenPDC PMU
Command: send CFG-2 frame
Command: data transmission on
Configurat
ion Frame 
2
Data Frame
Data Frame
Data Frame
Data Frame
Command: data transmission off
Command: data transmission off
Fig. 3: Observed sequence diagram of Synchrophasor protocol
in application layer
IV. TRAFFIC CAMOUFLAGE
The counter-countermeasure consists of 2 steps: (1) Zbot
traffic is transformed using FTE to hide the source protocol;
(2) the output of FTE is improved with SCM to modify inter-
packet delays to evade side-channel analysis.
A. FTE
The input of FTE includes the message to encrypt and the
regular expression describing the target protocol. The output
ciphertext matches the input regular expression. There is a
parameter, called fixed slice, which refers to the number of
bytes that FTE receiver-side should decrypt of an incoming
stream. For example, the target regular expression is ‘∧(a|b)+
$’, which matches an arbitrary long string only comprising a
or b. Given a message helloworld and fixed slice = 512, a
string of aaaaaaaabababaab...bababbabaaababab containing
512 characters is obtained.
The goal is to transform Zbot traffic into a valid PMU data
stream. PMU data is collected to infer a regular expression for
synchrophasor protocol. Table I shows the structure of a PMU
data packet [42], and the number of observed values for all
fields. The extracted regular expression that fully describes
observed PMU traffic is very complex. The transformation
using this regular expression requires excessive computational
resources.
TABLE I: PMU packet fields in application layer
Byte
Poisition
Length
in Bytes
Parameter
Name
Number of
observed
values
0 - 1 2 Synchroni-zation word 1
2 - 3 2 Framesize 1
4 - 5 2 PMU/DCID number 1
6 - 9 4 SOC timestamp (UTC) 3958
10 1 Time qualityflag 4
11 - 13 3 Fraction ofsecond (raw) 30
14 - 15 2 Flags 4
16 - 271 8each
Phasor #1
- #32
118713
each
272 - 275 4
Actual
frequency
value
52
276 - 279 4
Rate of
change of
frequency
7573
280 - 281 2 Digital statuswords 1
282 - 283 2 PMU checksum 54887
In this study, the FTE performance if improved by mapping
observed PMU traffic directly to a regular expression. The
Zbot traffic is first transformed with FTE using an example
regular expression ‘∧[0 − 9a − f ] + $’. The output string
consists of a sequence of hexadecimal symbols. There are
16 possibilities for each character position. Each character
position corresponds to one PMU packet field. For each PMU
packet field (Figure I), the observed values of that field are
divided into 16 groups and assign each group a unique symbol.
Based on the predefined mapping relation from hexadecimal
symbols to groups of value, for each character in the output
string of FTE, a value is randomly picked from the related
group.
Note that the previous procedure only applies to fields with
at least 16 possible values. For fields with less than 16 possible
values, a random value from the observation is used. For
example, suppose the FTE output is ‘a10b5d7...’. The first
character ‘a’ corresponds to group number 10. So it can be
replaced by a random value in the 10th group of the first field
of PMU packet, which is ‘SOC time stamp (UTC)’.
There are several advantages of the proposed mapping
technique: (1) The input regular expression is straightforward.
There is no need to extract regular expressions from tar-
get protocols. (2) Since regular expression extraction is not
needed, the process can be easily automated. (3) The proposed
mapping uses observed data, so the output is closer to real
PMU traffic than traditional FTE. (4) The throughput can
be increased by adjusting the number of symbols used to
represent one protocol field.
B. Timing Side-Channel Massage (SCM)
Timing SCM modifies inter-packet delays to match the
target protocol to evade side-channel analysis. Given collected
inter-packet delays of the target protocol, a deterministic
HMM representing the timing pattern is constructed. A HMM
is a statistical Markov model in which the modeled system
is a Markov process with unobserved (hidden) states. The
standard HMM in [43] has two sets of random processes: states
and outputs (observations). In a deterministic HMM, there
is only a single set of random processes. In this model, the
state transition labels are uniquely associated with an output
alphabet.
To infer the HMM representing the timing pattern of PMU
traffic, packet collection is performed on the PMU side. The
time difference, 4t, is calculated by subtracting the receive
time of the previous packet from the time of the current packet.
In other words, 4ti = ti − ti1 where ti is the receive time
of packet i. Obviously, the first packet in the data sequence
will not have a value, so the process start with i = 2. This
step is done so that network latencies between the source and
the destination are filtered out. Using the calculated values
of 4t, the data is symbolized by grouping it into ranges
and assigning anything in that range a unique symbol such
as a or b. The symbolization result of is shown as Figure
4. Given the symbolized data sequence, the zero knowledge
HMM inference algorithm introduced in [30]–[32] is used to
create the deterministic HMM. The inferred model is shown
in Figure 5.
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Fig. 4: The symbolization of inter-packet timing delays of
legitimate PMU traffic
Given the model, the counterfeit PMU starts the timing
SCM process by randomly selecting a start state in the model.
S0 S1
a(0.51)
a(1-10-5)
b(10-5)
b(0.49)
Fig. 5: The HMM of inter-packet timing delay side-channel
of legitimate PMU traffic
Fig. 6: Screenshot of botnet traffic (part)
To send the packet, a transition is taken from the current state
and the corresponding delay is waited before sending a packet
to the PDC. If there are more than one possible transitions out
of current state, the transition is chosen randomly, weighed on
the probability of each transition.
V. EXPERIMENT
A. Traffic Collection
A Zeus C&C server and a Zeus bot are set up in the
lab on two Windows XP virtual machines. Figure 6 shows
example botnet traffic. There are two protocols used: HTTP
is for communication with the C&C PHP server, and TCP for
information exchange between bot and botmaster. The volume
of the collected bot traffic is 1.4MB.
In the Real-Time Power and Intelligent Systems (RTPIS)
Laboratory of Clemson University [44], a real-time power
system is simulated with one hardware PMU and software
openPDC (as PDC). Network traffic between PMU and PDC
are collected with Wireshark on the same machine (windows
7 OS) running openPDC software. The traffic collection lasts
around one hour, and the volume of collected traffic is
108.9MB.
B. Experiment Setup
The experiment setup is in Figure 7. The implementation
includes a client-side program (counterfeit PMU program)
deployed on the bot and a decoder integrated as a front end
of C&C server. The client-side program takes the Zbot data
stream as input, processes it with FTE then SCM. It then
sends the false PMU data over the network. When the data
arrives at the server side, it is decoded by the FTE decoder
and forwarded the to C&C server.
Fig. 7: Experiment setup.
C. Experiment, Results and Analysis
It is found that the bot and its C&C server communicate
fluently with the deployment of the traffic camouflage system.
This indicates the false PMU data is decoded correctly before
forwarded to the C&C server.
As shown in Figure 8a, the false PMU packets are recog-
nized as the synchrophasor protocol, i.e., the protocol used
for PMU-PDC communication. The packet details of false
PMU displayed in Wireshark are shown in Figure 9a, which
contain all the fields of a standard PMU packet as shown in
Table I. Values of each field are legitimate because they are
consistent with the real PMU packets. In particular, the voltage
and current measurements are all within a reasonable range
compared with real PMU packet shown in Figure9b.
(a) Screen-shot of false PMU traffic (part)
(b) Screen-shot of real PMU to PDC traffic (part)
Fig. 8: Comparison between false PMU traffic and real PMU
to PDC traffic
To further evaluate the proposed approach, side-channel
analysis in [4] is launched against the false PMU data flow.
The confidence interval (CI) approach in [45] is used to
determine if the observed false PMU traffic matches the PMU
HMM (see Figure 5). The inter-packet delays of the false
PMU packets are computed and symbolized. Given the sym-
bolized string, the CI method traces the data back through the
HMM. Meanwhile, transition probabilities and corresponding
confidence intervals are estimated by frequency counting. This
process maps the observation data into the HMM structure.
(a) Screen-shot of a typical camouflaged Zbot packet (part)
(b) Screen-shot of a typical PMU measurement packet (part)
Fig. 9: Comparison between camouflaged Zbot packet and
PMU measurement packet
After the confidence intervals are estimated, the percent of
transition probabilities from originally given HMM that fall
into their respective confidence interval are determined. If this
percentage is greater than a threshold value, it is accepted that
the observations adequately match the HMM, i.e., the collected
PMU traffic is legitimate in terms of timing.
Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are usually
used to find the optimal threshold value. By varying the
threshold from 0% to 100%, the criteria for acceptance is
progressively increased. Since the HMM (see Figure 5) in
this experiment only contains 2 states and each state has one
probability distribution, there are only 3 possible values for
the percentage of probability distributions that match, which
are 0, 50%, 100%. So there is no need for a ROC curve.
The detection results using these three values are given in
Table II, where TPR denoted true positive rate, FPR denotes
the false positive rate, and l is the threshold used for detection.
TPR means the percentage of real PMU traffic that is correctly
identified by Wireshark, while FPR means the percentage of
false PMU traffic that is identified as PMU traffic. As shown
in the results, it is impossible to obtain a high TPR and low
FPR at the same time no matter how l varies. Therefore, it is
difficult to perform an effective side-channel analysis.
TABLE II: TPR-FPR with different thresholds
Threshold l l = 0 0 < l ≤ 0.5 0.5 < l ≤ 1
TPR 1 1 0.0193
FPR 1 0.9611 0.0352
A communication channel is built between the counterfeit
PMU and software OpenPDC. All false PMU traffic is ac-
cepted by OpenPDC. This shows that the proposed method
is capable of producing false PMU data stream close to real
PMU.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, one protocol is transformed into another
to disguise the original traffic and deceive existing network
traffic detection approaches, including side-channel analysis.
As an illustration, Zbot C&C traffic is transformed to PMU
data stream. The experiment shows that the syntax of the
counterfeit PMU packet is consistent with real PMU traffic.
The proposed method is also resistant to timing side-channel
analysis. False PMU packets are accepted by OpenPDC with-
out any errors. Other target protocols can easily be used.
However, the proposed traffic camouflage counter-
countermeasure is not perfect. Future study includes: (1) The
current camouflage is off-line. On-line implementation is
needed. (2) The throughput can be increased by determining
the optimal number of character positions used to represent
a packet field. (3) Methods of selecting appropriate target
protocols are needed. (4) The ultimate goal of this study is to
make anti-virus community aware of this new way of hiding
malware traffic and therefore effective countermeasures are
needed.
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